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INTRODUCTION
Nino Esposito and Drew Bosee have been in a committed same-
sex relationship for forty-five years and “married in almost every
sense of the word.”1 Along with millions around the United States,
they celebrated when the Supreme Court announced its ruling in
Obergefell v. Hodges—that same-sex couples have a constitutional
right to marry.2 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that “the right to
marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person,”
and that individual states cannot discriminate against a couple on
the basis of sexual orientation.3 Focusing on “the transcendent im-
portance of marriage,” the Court identified marriage as a stabilizing
force in our social order.4 The Court concluded that although homo-
sexuality had been considered taboo in the past, changing dynamics
in our society, an evolution of our cultural mores, and a robust
debate about same-sex marriage reinforced the concept of marriage
as a fundamental right that may not be denied to same-sex couples.5
However, Nino and Drew still cannot marry.6 In 2012, in order to
gain legal recognition of their relationship, Drew allowed Nino to
adopt him.7 And as adoptive “father and son,” Nino and Drew are
now prohibited from marrying under their home state of Pennsyl-
vania’s incest statute, which prohibits marriage between a parent
and child, including the “relationship of parent and child by adop-
tion.”8 Although sympathetic to their situation, a Pennsylvania
judge believed that under the current law, including Obergefell, he
1. Yanan Wang, These Gay Men Became ‘Father & Son.’ Now They Want to Get Married
but Can’t., WASH. POST (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/
wp/2015/11/05/these-gay-men-became-father-and-son-now-they-want-to-get-married-but-cant/
[https://perma.cc/F4DX-5FE7].
2. See Avianne Tan, Celebrations Break Out After Same-Sex Marriage Legalized
Nationwide, ABC NEWS (June 26, 2015, 1:01 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/US/celebrations-
break-sex-marriage-legalized-nationwide/story?id=32051778 [https://perma.cc/7QLC-AKGL].
3. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604-05 (2015).
4. Id. at 2594.
5. See id. at 2605-07.
6. See Wang, supra note 1.
7. See id. Adoption was a common choice for many same-sex couples who were frustrated
with the inability to have their relationship legally recognized. See id.
8. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302 (2016).
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was unable to annul the adoption to allow the couple to legally
marry.9
Incest remains one of the most entrenched taboos in American
society.10 Opponents of same-sex marriage have regularly seized on
incest when arguing that the legalization of same-sex marriage will
lead to a new “parade of horribles.”11 Perhaps more importantly,
dissenters from the Supreme Court’s recent substantive due process
cases have also noted that the doctrinal standards developed in the
area of “substantive” due process are nowhere to be found in the
majority decision.12 Theirs is a concern for judicial restraint that
counsels against courts “creating” new fundamental rights when-
ever political correctness may call for it.13 Yet, because incest impli-
cates questions of sexual autonomy, privacy, reproductive rights,
and marriage—all contentious areas of due process disputes—it
raises substantial questions about our current prohibitions against
incest and other similarly condemned relationships in light of the
Obergefell decision. 
This Note posits that the Court’s historical treatment of a “right
to marry” combined with the majority’s rationale in Obergefell may
make broad restrictions on who may marry whom unconstitutional,
and that such treatment opens the door to the recognition of other
9. See Wang, supra note 1.
10. JONATHAN H. TURNER & ALEXANDRA MARYANSKI, INCEST: ORIGINS OF THE TABOO 1
(2005) (“Humans have been fascinated by incest for all of recorded history.”).
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery,
fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’
validation of laws based on moral choices.”); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986)
(“[I]f respondent’s submission is limited to the voluntary sexual conduct between consenting
adults, it would be difficult, except by fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct
while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even though
they are committed in the home.”); see also Y. Carson Zhou, The Incest Horrible: Delimiting
the Lawrence v. Texas Right to Sexual Autonomy, 23 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 187, 190 (2016)
(“Incest, in short, is now treated as a constitutional laugh-out-loud test; if a court decision
compels the decriminalization of incest, the decision must not have been constitutionally
compelled.”); Wesley Pruden, Why Gays ‘Can’t Get No Satisfaction,’ WASH. TIMES (June 29,
2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/29/wesley-pruden-slippery-slope-of-
supreme-court-gay-/ [https://perma.cc/GCP9-5U6J] (noting that the decision in Obergefell will
likely lead to further litigation in determining the right to marry).
12. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2618 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 2616; see also Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952)
(noting that courts “do not sit as a super-legislature to weigh the wisdom of legislation”).
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relationship constructs, including incestuous relationships between
consenting adults. Some scholars have argued that the criminal-
ization of incest, as in the sexual act itself, may no longer enjoy any
constitutional validity,14 but very few have considered how the
Court’s changing jurisprudence may affect civil bans on marriage
between close relatives.15 The intent of this Note is not to advocate
for the recognition of incestuous marriage, or for a change in any
current laws. Rather, this Note analyzes how the majority’s ration-
ale for finding that the right to marry extends to same-sex couples
raises significant questions regarding the historical justification for
blanket bans on other relationship constructs.16 In doing so, this
Note uses incest as a template for examining the rationale of such
prohibitions.
Part I introduces the taboo against incest and the present state
of incest laws in the United States. Part II briefly traces the devel-
opment of the fundamental right to marriage and focuses on how
the Obergefell majority’s rationale alters previous “substantive” due
process jurisprudence. Part III argues that the legal justification for
complete bans on incestuous marriage between consenting adults
fails to meet an exacting scrutiny and that, as a result, such laws
are unconstitutional. This Note also proposes that, if incest laws are
unconstitutional, then states may still be able to regulate such
marriages under the “undue burden” analysis announced by the
Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylva-
nia v. Casey.17 Finally, Part IV examines some counterarguments to
this proposed theory and ultimately concludes that, although the
jurisprudential landscape may require states to allow incestuous
marriages between consenting adults, the lack of large-scale public
support and entrenched attitudes on the Court make it unlikely that
any such change will occur in the near future.
14. See Brett H. McDonnell, Is Incest Next?, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 337, 337-38 (2004).
15. See, e.g., Carolyn S. Bratt, Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right of Marriage: Is
Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q. 257, 259 (1984).
16. Although this Note will focus on adult consensual incest, it may be possible to extrapo-
late the arguments to other constructs. For an excellent discussion of how Obergefell will
impact polyamorous marriages, see Jack B. Harrison, On Marriage and Polygamy, 42 OHIO
N.U. L. REV. 89 (2015).
17. 505 U.S. 833, 876-77 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
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I. THE INCEST TABOO
Before beginning any discussion of the legal implications regard-
ing incestuous marriage, an initial understanding of the taboo is in
order. This Part reviews the history of incest, the empirical evidence
and statistics related to the incidence of incest, and the current
state of incest laws in the United States.
The word incest does not have a single meaning; the word itself
can bring different images to mind for different people.18 It is essen-
tial to understand what courts and legislatures mean when they
speak of incest in the law. Incest is generally defined as “[s]exual re-
lations between family members or close relatives, including child-
ren related by adoption.”19 Individual legislatures determine what
degree of familial relationship is prohibited. This degree is referred
to as consanguinity; the closer the relationship between people, the
greater the consanguinity.20 As one scholar put it, in the legal forum
“‘[i]ncest’ describes a relationship the government has chosen to
proscribe, drawing the line somewhere on the skin of the consan-
guineous onion.”21 A state may also choose to define incest not only
by blood but by marriage as well; this is called affinity.22
Under these definitions, there are two primary forms of incest
that may occur. The first occurs when an adult parent, relative, or
older sibling of a minor takes advantage of that child.23 This type of
incest is not the subject of this Note; it is properly criminalized
18. Brendan J. Hammer, Note, Tainted Love: What the Seventh Circuit Got Wrong in
Muth v. Frank, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1065, 1065 (2007) (“Perhaps [incest] is the relatively
benign image of ‘kissin’ cousins’ in a moonshine-fueled backwoods pairing. Perhaps it is the
sickening thought of the violent sexual abuse of a child at the hands of her father or brother.”
(footnote omitted)).
19. Incest, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
20. “Consanguinity” is defined as “[t]he relationship of persons of the same blood or ori-
gin.” Consanguinity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
21. Hammer, supra note 18, at 1068.
22. See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Rahim, 805 N.E.2d 13, 15 (Mass. 2004) (analyzing
the current status of incest laws based on marriage, rather than blood). For a further
discussion of the regulation of incest through affinity, see Christine McNiece Metteer, Some
“Incest” Is Harmless Incest: Determining the Fundamental Right to Marry of Adults Related
by Affinity Without Resorting to State Incest Statutes, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 262 (2000).
23. See Note, Inbred Obscurity: Improving Incest Laws in the Shadows of the “Sexual
Family,” 119 HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2465 (2006).
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through rape, sexual assault, and abuse statutes.24 The second type
of incest is when a consensual relationship occurs between compe-
tent, consanguineous adults.25 This Note focuses on this type of
incestuous relationship.
A. The History of Incest
The concept of incest knows nearly no geographical or cultural
bounds. It has been argued that the incest taboo is so widespread
that it “is generally regarded ... [as] the evolutionary Rubicon of
human social life.”26
Literature and mythology of many cultures are rife with refer-
ences to incestuous relationships. In Greek mythology, Zeus and
Hera were brother and sister as well as husband and wife and the
parents of a number of other gods.27 In the folklore of Mesopotamia,
Enil created life by committing incest with his mother, Ki.28 Perhaps
closer to Western culture, the Old Testament of the Christian Bible
is replete with examples of consensual incest.29 One could argue that
the first occurrence of sexual relations in history, Adam copulating
with Eve, was incestuous.30
The occurrence of incest was not only limited to stories. Egyptian
law permitted marriage between brothers and sisters, although it
was mostly limited to the royal families.31 To this day, in certain
areas of India and southeastern Asia, it is a widely practiced cus-
tom for men to marry their biological nieces.32 In Western culture,
notables such as Albert Einstein and Charles Darwin both married
24. See generally id. (discussing the application of criminal laws to instances of consensual
and nonconsensual incest). 
25. See id. at 2465.
26. Seymour Parker, The Waning of the Incest Taboo, 11 LEGAL STUD. F. 205, 206 (1987).
27. J.M. Hunt, The Olympians, GREEK MYTHOLOGY, http://www.desy.de/gna/interpedia/
greek_myth/olympian.html [https://perma.cc/Q8BY-NM48]; see also, e.g., P.B. Adamson,
Consanguinous Marriages in the Ancient World, 93 FOLKLORE 85, 85 (1982).
28. See Adamson, supra note 27, at 85.
29. See, e.g., Genesis 11:26-29 (uncle marrying his neice); Genesis 19:31-38 (father sleeping
with his daughters); Genesis 20:12-13 (brother marrying his half-sister).
30. Cf. Genesis 4:1-2. 
31. See Russell Middleton, Brother-Sister and Father-Daughter Marriage in Ancient
Egypt, 27 AM. SOC. REV. 603, 603 (1962).
32. See 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF HEALTH, NUTRITION AND FAMILY WELFARE 166 (S. Wal &
Ruchi Mishra eds., 2000).
2017] EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF OBERGEFELL 2069
their first cousins.33 Darwin and his wife even had ten children to-
gether.34 Frequent consanguineous unions occurred within the well-
respected and well-known Rothschild family, and in numerous royal
families, most notably the Hapsburgs and the royal families of
Hawaii.35
None of this should downplay the seriousness of the taboo against
incest. While it may appear that primitive cultures would be more
likely to allow incest, an early study of almost 250 different societies
found that all of them had banned relationships between immediate
family members.36 The study emphasized that the “incest taboos and
exogamous restrictions ... are characterized by a peculiar intensity
and emotional quality.”37 Both normative and directive forces within
society work to generate proscriptions against incestuous behavior.38
Although incest was not criminalized at English common law, it was
contrary to church law.39 Bishops had wide discretion in assigning
punishment for such an offense.40 Even within literature, incest was
not always considered an acceptable act. One of the most famous
33. See Nikki Racklin, We Are Family, GUARDIAN OBSERVER (Dec. 8, 2002), https://www.
theguardian.com/theobserver/2002/dec/08/magazine.features7 [https://perma.cc/R4TQ-YEGL].
34. See id.
35. See H.E. Malden, Historic Genealogy, 4 TRANSACTIONS ROYAL HIST. SOC’Y 103, 105-06,
110, 112-13 (1889); Joanne Carando, Hawaiian Royal Incest: A Study in the Sacrificial Origin
of Monarchy, 1 TRANSATLANTICA, no. 1, 2002, at 2-3, 10-11, https://transatlantica.revues.org/
525 [https://perma.cc/L2RW-7GF5]; Richard Conniff, Go Ahead, Kiss Your Cousin: Heck,
Marry Her If You Want To, DISCOVER (Aug. 1, 2003), http://discovermagazine.com/2003/aug/
featkiss [https://perma.cc/SJ2T-8T7G].
36. See TURNER & MARYANSKI, supra note 10, at 65-66; see also KARIN C. MEISELMAN,
INCEST: A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS WITH TREATMENT RECOMMEND-
ATIONS 4 (1978).
37. TURNER & MARYANSKI, supra note 10, at 66 (alteration in original) (quoting GEORGE
PETER MURDOCK, SOCIAL STRUCTURE 288 (1949)).
38. See id. at 67-68, 69 tbl.3.2 (discussing the cultural influences affecting the incest taboo
and the level of effect each has on different incestuous relationships).
39. See People v. Baker, 442 P.2d 675, 677-78 (Cal. 1968) (“Incest was not a common law
crime in England; punishment was left solely to the ecclesiastical courts.”). Incest was crimin-
alized in Britain through the Punishment of Incest Act in 1908. Punishment of Incest Act
1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 45; see also VIKKI BELL, INTERROGATING INCEST: FEMINISM, FOUCAULT AND
THE LAW app. 1 at 186-88 (1993) (discussing the current state of incest laws in England and
Scotland). 
40. See 1 R.H. HELMHOLZ, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: THE CANON
LAW AND ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION FROM 597 TO THE 1640S, at 50, 628-29 (2004).
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depictions of incest, the story of the Greek king Oedipus and his in-
cestuous relationship with his mother, ends in tragedy and death.41
B. Empirical Evidence of Incest
Available statistics show that the incidence of consanguineous
incest is higher than anecdotal evidence would suggest. For exam-
ple, in areas of northern Africa, central and western Asia, and some
parts of southern Asia, studies have shown that consanguineous
relationships account for nearly 20 percent of all unions, and in
some areas may even exceed 50 percent.42 In Japan, the rate of
incestuous marriages is estimated to hover around 3.9 percent, but
in areas such as Fukushima and Hirando, it may exceed 10 per-
cent.43 However, given the social views toward incestuous relation-
ships, reliable statistics on the occurrence of such relationships are
difficult to come by.44 Even the global statistics that are released
offer a disclaimer that they reflect only an approximation of what is
potentially a much larger actual incidence of incest.45
C. Incest Laws in the United States
As in England, incest was not a common law crime in the United
States.46 The criminal statutes for incest vary widely by state. Rhode
41. See SOPHOCLES, OEDIPUS THE KING 80, 92-94 (Stephen Berg & Diskin Clay trans.,
Oxford Univ. Press 1978). But see HOMER, THE ODYSSEY bk. XI (E.V. Rieu trans., 1946) (dis-
cussing the Oedipus story and allowing Oedipus to continue to live on and rule Thebes after
his incestuous marriage).
42. See Alan H. Bittles, The Role and Significance of Consanguinity as a Demographic
Variable, 20 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 561, 563 (1994).
43. See id. (noting the decline in first cousin unions from approximately 8 to 5 percent in
the 1950s to 3.9 percent in the 1980s); see also Alan H. Bittles, Empirical Estimates of the
Global Prevalence of Consanguineous Marriage in Contemporary Societies 15-17 tbl.1, 24-40
tbl.3 (Morrison Inst. for Population & Res. Studies, Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 74,
1998).
44. See TURNER & MARYANSKI, supra note 10, at 53 (“Because incest is prohibited ... it is
difficult to get reliable data on rates of incest in contemporary families.”).
45. See Hammer, supra note 18, at 1070-71 (“Global statistics on the prevalence of blood-
related marriage provide only a rough approximation of what is, potentially, the larger
number of instances of consanguineous sexual relations.”).
46. See Graham Hughes, The Crime of Incest, 55 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI.
322, 323 (1964).
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Island repealed all criminal laws related to incest in 1989.47 Ohio,
which includes incestuous acts under its definition of “sexual
battery,” does not prohibit sex between brothers and sisters.48 In
Michigan and New Jersey, incest is “a subcategory of criminal
sexual conduct” when either party to the relationship is between
thirteen and sixteen years old;49 however, neither of those states
prohibit incest if both individuals are eighteen or older.50 Florida’s
incest law is limited to only sex between a man and a woman who
are related by blood,51 even though homosexual incest—between a
mother and daughter or father and son—is likely more common
than previously thought.52 Indeed, fewer states currently prohibit
sex between first cousins than those that banned sodomy before the
ruling in Lawrence v. Texas.53
All fifty states do, however, have some form of regulation banning
incestuous marriage, but the degree of consanguinity these laws
prohibit varies widely.54 Certain states allow marriages between
individuals who are related by affinity—that is, step-parents and
step-siblings—rather than by consanguinity.55 Bans on incestuous
marriage between members of the nuclear family are universal, but
the United States appears to be unique in Western culture in
explicitly banning marriage between first cousins, even though, as
noted above, sexual relations between such relatives is generally
allowed.56 Some states specifically tie criminal punishment to their
marriage statutes. In these states, parties that are banned from
marrying also face criminal charges for engaging in sexual
47. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-4 (repealed 1989).
48. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2907.03(A)(5) (West 2016).
49. See Leigh B. Bienen, Defining Incest, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1501, 1564 (1998).
50. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 349 n.74 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 750.520b,
750.520c (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2 (West 1979)).
51. FLA. STAT. § 826.04 (2017).
52. See TURNER & MARYANSKI, supra note 10, at 53, 59.
53. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 350.
54. See NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, STATUTORY COMPILATION REGARDING INCEST STAT-
UTES (2013), http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/Incest%20Statutes%202013.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6Q6-
6REJ].
55. Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46B-21 (2015) (prohibiting marriages of those related by
blood or marriage), and VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 511 (2016) (same), with CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 2200 (West 2016) (limiting the definition of “incestuous marriages” to those relatives who
are of the “half as well as the whole blood”).
56. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 349.
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relations.57 Rhode Island’s law contains an exception to allow mar-
riages that would otherwise be void under its incest statutes if those
marriages are permitted by the Jewish religion.58 This wide variety
of restrictions may also raise problems for those individuals who
may be allowed to marry in one state but have difficulty getting
their marriage recognized when they move to a state with broader
prohibitions on incestuous marriage.59
II. DEFINING THE RIGHT TO MARRY
The concept of substantive due process and individual rights has
developed over time.60 The right to marriage, and its associated
rights of procreation, has raised particularly controversial questions
for the Court.61 This Part traces the development of the right to
marry, beginning with the original formulation and doctrine used
by the Supreme Court in defining the right. It then examines the
Obergefell decision in detail and discusses how Justice Kennedy,
and particularly the majority opinion he authored, has altered sub-
stantive due process jurisprudence regarding the right to marry.
Finally, this Part briefly concludes by synthesizing the different
doctrinal threads and identifying the current state and understand-
ing of the fundamental right to marriage.
57. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 944.06 (2017) (criminalizing incest when the persons are “relat-
ed in a degree within which the marriage of the parties is prohibited by the law of this state”).
58. 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-1-4 (2017).
59. Although only briefly addressed in Obergefell, the Court held that other states must
recognize marriages that are performed and held lawful in another state, thus rendering this
issue moot. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015).
60. See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L.
REV. 493, 502 (1997); see also The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 122, 193 (1998) (discussing the development of the Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence).
61. See generally Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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A. The Court’s History
Although the extent to which the Constitution protects unenum-
erated rights has varied over time,62 the Supreme Court has consis-
tently recognized marriage as one of the most significant rights of
an individual.63 At times, the Court has focused solely on protecting
the interests of each individual participating in the marriage.64 At
other times, the focus has been on the family as a whole unit in
order to protect the significance of marriage itself and the interests
of children born as a result of the marriage.65 But at the core of this
“right to marry” is the right to individualized choice in marriage and
family relationships.66 
In Loving v. Virginia, the Court invalidated a Virginia antimis-
cegenation statute banning interracial marriages.67 The decision
focused on application of the Equal Protection Clause, but the right
to marry was characterized as a “vital personal right.”68 This case
alone sheds little light on the constitutional dimensions of the right
to marry, but it does reinforce that a state’s power to regulate the
choice a person may make regarding who to marry is not unlimited.
Similarly, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the Court struck down a Wis-
consin statute prohibiting noncustodial parents from remarrying if
they lacked the financial resources to meet their support obliga-
tions.69 The Court acknowledged that the recognition of a constitu-
tionally protected right to marry was a fundamental extension of its
62. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 338 (reviewing the history of the Supreme Court’s
recognition of unenumerated rights).
63. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Turner, 482 U.S. at 95; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at
386; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
64. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 94-95 (holding that the fundamental right to marry extends
to inmates); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (“[T]he freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.”).
65. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (“[S]o long as a parent adequately
cares for his or her children ... there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family.”); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87 (recognizing the right to
marry as a fundamental right and the foundation of family in society).
66. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 629 (3d ed. 1987).
67. 388 U.S. at 12.
68. Id.
69. 434 U.S. at 384-86.
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decisions respecting individual choice in the area of family relation-
ships, childrearing, and childbirth.70
In Turner v. Safley, the Court invalidated state regulations pro-
hibiting inmates from marrying without the permission of the
warden of the prison in which the inmate was housed.71 The choice
of whether to engage in the act of marriage was recognized as a
matter of individual choice outside the reach of state regulation.72
In so holding, the Court focused on three fundamental aspects of
marriage: (1) marriage is a public expression of support and com-
mitment; (2) marriage involves a spiritual and personal dynamic;
and (3) being married is a necessary condition to receiving many
government benefits.73 It is difficult to see how these characteristics
of a marital relationship, especially the desire to publicly commit
and express feelings for another, would apply with any less force to
a consanguineous couple than to any other monogamous couple
seeking civil recognition of their union.
The protections of the right to marry are not limited to the
institution itself. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court
held that marriage was deserving of protection because some liberty
interest was inherent in marriage itself.74 Importantly, though, the
Court rejected the argument that this liberty interest was protected
solely because marriage served as the basis for procreation and the
rearing of children.75 The Constitution limits the power of states to
interfere with a couple’s choice of whether to use contraception.76 As
a recent scholar noted: “The right to marry is not necessarily rooted
in or ancillary to these constitutional rights; rather, the Court has
recognized that constitutionally protected rights to sexual activity,
to procreation, or to raising children exist outside the context of
70. Id. at 386 (“[I]t would make little sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to
other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to enter the relationship that
is the foundation of the family in our society.”).
71. 482 U.S. 78, 100 (1987).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 95-96.
74. 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that marital privacy is a “privacy older than the
Bill of Rights”).
75. See id.
76. See id. (invalidating a state statute that banned couples from using contraception);
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (invalidating a state
statute which allowed sterilization of convicted criminals).
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marriage.”77 Modern evolution of the “American family” has forced
the Court to consider the different ways a person may become a
parent.78 Individuals may become parents through adoption, arti-
ficial insemination, or even when a mother and father do not believe
in the institution of marriage. All are situations in which the adults
have a legitimate interest in the parent-child relationship but do not
necessarily implicate the right to marry or even a right to an active
sexual relationship between the parents.79 But these individuals do
have a right to privacy and liberty with respect to their family life
under the Supreme Court’s prior decisions.80 Recognition of this
parent-child relationship and any subsequent constitutional protec-
tion flowing from such a recognized relationship is independent of
the concept of marriage, but nonetheless can only be interfered with
when a state can demonstrate a compelling interest.81
Recognition of a fundamental right to marry has not abrogated
the role of the state in the regulation of marriage.82 The state has
been a significant player in the marriage arena throughout Ameri-
can history.83 Such government regulation, however, is not unlim-
ited. Although marriage, like other areas of domestic relations, is
properly within the state police power, such regulations must be
supported by “sufficiently important state interests and [be] closely
tailored to effectuate only those interests.”84 If the regulation affects
an individual’s choice to marry in only an incidental way, then the
Court will subject it to only minimal scrutiny.85 
Incest statutes are an intentional intrusion into an individu-
al’s right to marry because the current civil bans on incestuous
77. Harrison, supra note 16, at 119-20; see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
78. See Harrison, supra note 16, at 120.
79. See id.
80. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573-74 (2003); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
63 (2000).
81. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66.
82. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691 (2013). But see Ethan J. Leib,
Hail Marriage and Farewell, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 41, 42-44 (2015) (arguing that states may
be able to and possibly should be removed completely from the marriage “business”).
83. See generally NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
(2000) (discussing the history of marriage in the United States).
84. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978); see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967).
85. See Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 387 n.12.
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marriage directly regulate the choice of a marriage partner. If the
couple falls within the defined consanguineous degree outlined by
the state statute, then the marriage is invalid. Thus, these types of
incest statutes should be subjected to the same type of rigorous
scrutiny exhibited by the Court’s earlier decisions.86 Certainly the
state has an interest in protecting aspects of family life, particularly
the well-being of children. The question moving forward is whether
such an interest is necessarily furthered or even implicated by pro-
hibiting incestuous marriages.
B. The Obergefell Decision
Even as Justice Kennedy read the result in Obergefell v. Hodges
from the bench, the decision took on an almost canonical status. The
language at the end of the majority opinion rang out as an affirma-
tion of the plaintiffs’ rights: “Their hope is not to be condemned to
live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institu-
tions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Con-
stitution grants them that right.”87 Although the long-term effects
of the decision have yet to play out, the rationale espoused by the
majority may have altered the way in which the Court will analyze
fundamental rights challenges. This Section examines how the
Court addressed the question raised in Obergefell, and how it re-
vised the roles of tradition and dignity in clarifying the fundamental
rights protected under the Constitution.
1. Equal Protection or Due Process?
The question posed in Obergefell is deceivingly simple: “whether
the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage
between two people of the same sex.”88 From a jurisprudential
perspective, that question shaped how the majority decided the
86. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558, 574 (2003); Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78,
94-95 (1987); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384-86; Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
87. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015).
88. Id. at 2593.
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case—the petitioners had invoked both the Due Process Clause and
the Equal Protection Clause in support of their position.89
Justice Kennedy did not equivocate—the majority opinion
grounded the Obergefell decision in the protections of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.90 Yet, while the majority pointed to the Due Process
Clause as the basis for its decision, it tied the Equal Protection
Clause to due process under the umbrella of personal dignity to help
define the contours of the doctrine.91 By cementing the right to
marry within the protection of the Due Process Clause, the rationale
espoused by Justice Kennedy revolutionized substantive due process
analysis in a way that will have ramifications for all future fun-
damental rights challenges.
2. The Role of Tradition
Perhaps more importantly, Obergefell effectively replaced the
Supreme Court’s older methodology for determining fundamental
rights with a more holistic approach. The Court rejected its more
rigid test for fundamental rights, best articulated in Washington
v. Glucksberg,92 in favor of a more reasoned balancing inquiry
that weighs individual liberties against governmental interests.93
Such an approach was first introduced by Justice Harlan’s dissent
in Poe v. Ullman.94 Justice Harlan’s analysis took past tradition
89. See Brief for Petitioners at 6-7, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556). 
90. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602-05; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Anthony M.
Kennedy Lecture at the Lewis & Clark School of Law: Liberty or Equality? (Sept. 23, 2015),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2673194 [https://perma.cc/WDK4-QP9L] (exploring why Justice
Kennedy elected to focus on due process rather than equal protection).
91. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. Professor Laurence Tribe has referred to this as the
“doctrine of equal dignity” and argues that it lays out a new rubric for examining fundamental
rights claims. Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16,
19-20 (2015).
92. See 521 U.S. 702, 719-21 (1997) (requiring that a right protected under the Due Pro-
cess Clause must be both “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and carefully
described to be consistent with the “guideposts for responsible decisionmaking” (first quoting
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion); and then quoting
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992))).
93. See Tribe, supra note 91, at 19-20.
94. See 367 U.S. 497, 522-24 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This dissent gained prece-
dential value when the majority of the Court adopted it in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 848-49 (1992).
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into account but was not shackled to the past because it considered
tradition itself a “living thing.”95
In Glucksberg, the Court found “that the Due Process Clause
specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition,’ and
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”96 It is important to
note that the formulation in Glucksberg required both prongs of this
analysis to be satisfied. Before that case, courts had been able to
focus on either the “tradition” inquiry or on finding the right nec-
essary for “ordered liberty.”97 By making the test conjunctive, the
Supreme Court forced courts to consider historical precedent to find
that a substantive right exists.98 Scholars have noted that this trend
has made the Due Process Clause a “backward-looking” protection,
safeguarding against activist judges and temporary majorities.99
Both Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts pointed out the appar-
ent abandonment of this principle by the Obergefell majority.100
Justice Kennedy could have avoided pressing this issue. As Pro-
fessor Kenji Yoshino has pointed out, although “the ‘right to same-
sex marriage’ was not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition,’ the ‘right to marry’ certainly was.”101 By focusing on the
definition of the right being claimed, the majority could have side-
stepped questions about the role of tradition and left that portion of
the Glucksberg test intact.102 Some have argued that this is what the
95. Poe, 367 U.S. at 542.
96. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21 (citations omitted) (first quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at
503; and then quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
97. See Kenji Yoshino, The Supreme Court, 2014 Term—Comment: A New Birth of
Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 152 (2015).
98. See id. (“Even when the Court has been at its most aggressive in discerning ‘new’
rights in its substantive due process jurisprudence, it has thrown sops to tradition.”).
99. See, e.g., id. at 152-53.
100. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
Court has held that ‘liberty’ under the Due Process Clause should be understood to protect
only those rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.’” (citations
omitted) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720-21)); id. at 2618 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(pointing out that the “importance of history and tradition to the fundamental rights inquiry”
has been consistently adopted by courts both before and after Glucksberg).
101. Yoshino, supra note 97, at 163 (footnotes omited).
102. See id. A second prong of Glucksberg requires a “‘careful description’ of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721. Justice Kennedy, however, has
never appeared to buy into such a formulation. In subsequent cases, he has always favored
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majority did, and, therefore, the Obergefell decision is consistent
with Glucksberg because it defined the right in question in broad
strokes.103 For example, the majority opinion explicitly points out
that “Loving did not ask about a ‘right to interracial marriage’;
Turner did not ask about a ‘right of inmates to marry’; and Zablocki
did not ask about a ‘right of fathers with unpaid child support duties
to marry.’”104 By taking advantage of the latitude offered by a higher
level of abstraction, Justice Kennedy could have avoided the issue
of tradition.105 
Instead, Justice Kennedy chose to address what role tradition
should play in determining fundamental rights. There were unmis-
takable traces of Lawrence in the opinion. For example, the opinion
noted the inability of past generations to recognize deficiencies in
liberty “in [their] own time[ ]” and the wisdom of the Framers in
entrusting the protection of liberty to future generations.106 Yet,
Obergefell went further by renouncing any formula or straight-
forward test for the protection of fundamental rights.107 Rather, this
new methodology “requires courts to exercise reasoned judgment in
identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State
must accord them its respect.”108 By explicitly invoking Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Poe, the majority signaled that it was departing
from the prior Glucksberg formulation and that a new method was
forthcoming.109
Critics of the opinion claim that this doctrinal rationale revives
the often criticized analysis employed by the Court in Lochner v.
a more broad-stroke approach to defining the right in question. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (defining the right as private sexual behavior, rather than homo-
sexual sodomy); see also Daniel J. Crooks III, Toward “Liberty”: How the Marriage of
Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in Lawrence and Windsor Sets the Stage for
the Inevitable Loving of Our Time, 8 CHARLESTON L. REV. 223, 273-74 (2013-2014).
103. See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 331, 343 (2016).
104. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602.
105. See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 163.
106. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
107. See id.
108. Id.
109. See id. at 2602; see also Yoshino, supra note 97, at 163-64 (discussing how Obergefell
departs from Glucksberg).
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New York.110 Lochner remains one of the most reviled cases in con-
stitutional law, and Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent cites Lochner no
fewer than sixteen times.111 The dissenters’ claim is that without the
strict guidelines of a method like Glucksberg, activist jurists will
invent new substantive rights based on potentially temporary popu-
list views.112 In his recent comment on Obergefell, Professor Yoshino
persuasively dismisses this comparison by pointing out an “antisub-
ordination” principle relied on by the majority in reaching its
decision.113 He argues that the “freedom of contract” Lochner es-
poused was never understood as redressing the subordination of
master bakers by their employers.114 In contrast, Obergefell is easily
understood to redress the subordination of same-sex couples and
LGBT individuals.115 Yoshino’s point is that by tying the decision to
both due process and equal protection, “one of the major inputs into
any such [fundamental rights] analysis will be the impact of grant-
ing or denying such liberties to historically subordinated groups.”116
Rather than engaging in mechanical “careful description[s]” of
rights and identifying historical “tradition[s],” as under Glucks-
berg,117 the more holistic analysis introduced in Poe and accepted in
Obergefell will help the courts realize “‘what freedom ... must be-
come.’”118 
The result, then, is that substantive due process analysis will
serve to validate equality concerns of vulnerable, and likely minor-
ity, groups. If denying a group access to a claimed right continues a
period of exclusion and subordination for that group, then the twin
110. See, e.g., Symposium, The Supreme Court Has Legalized Same-Sex Marriage: Now
What?, NAT’L REV. (June 27, 2015), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420420/same-sex-
marriage-obergefell-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/AP7L-EJP5]; Gil Troy, Who Let the Su-
preme Court Make Laws?, DAILY BEAST (July 11, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.
com/articles/2015/07/11/how-to-restrict-the-lawmaking-power-of-the-supreme-court.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5SQ-AWBH].
111. See Michael C. Dorf, Symposium: In Defense of Justice Kennedy’s Soaring Language,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/symposium-in-
defense-of-justice-kennedys-soaring-language [https://perma.cc/K442-RNTX].
112. See Tribe, supra note 91, at 17-18.
113. See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 174-75.
114. Id. at 175.
115. See id. at 174-75; see also Tribe, supra note 91, at 18.
116. Yoshino, supra note 97, at 174.
117. Id. at 150 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997)).
118. Id. at 179 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015)).
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protections of due process and equal protection will intervene to
correct that balance.119
3. A Focus on Dignity
Such a development should not be surprising given the Court’s
and, more specifically, Justice Kennedy’s recent history. The notion
that all individuals are entitled to “define [their] own concept of
existence”120 instead of allowing the state to define their identity
and social role has been prevalent in Justice Kennedy’s most mem-
orable fundamental rights decisions.121 It most clearly developed
through his gay-rights opinions: Romer v. Evans, Lawrence v. Texas,
and United States v. Windsor.122 In each successive opinion, Justice
Kennedy became more explicit about ensuring that no individual is
a “stranger to [the] laws.”123 This decades-long journey reached its
culmination in Obergefell v. Hodges where “Justice Kennedy has
wound the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses more tightly,
finally fusing them together ... with the notion of ‘equal dignity in
the eyes of the law.’”124 This ongoing trend toward individual dignity
suggests that, for the moment, the Court will examine fundamental
rights challenges in the light of present cultural understandings and
knowledge rather than feel bound by past mores or antiquated
custom.125
119. See id. at 174.
120. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
121. See Tribe, supra note 91, at 22-23.
122. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (“A law declaring that in general it shall be
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is
itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”); Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003) (“Equality of treatment and the due process right to demand respect
for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects,
and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.”); United States v. Windsor, 133
S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (“[N]o legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to dispar-
age and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood
and dignity.”).
123. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
124. Tribe, supra note 91, at 22-23 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608); see also id. at
20-21 (exploring the importance of the term “dignity” in constitutions and treaties around the
world).
125. Such progressive thinking within the Court is not limited to constitutional issues.
Federal antitrust law is founded on the idea that challenged restraints on trade must be
examined “in the light of reason” understanding modern economic thinking. See Cont’l T.V.,
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This concept of “equal dignity”126 further broadens the scope of
constitutional protections. It has been argued that the Constitution
traditionally protects negative liberties—that is, the right of people
to be protected “against government interference with certain
fundamental rights and liberty interests”127—rather than positive
ones.128 Ratifying the dignity of an individual, however, necessarily
requires the granting of a positive right. After Obergefell, states not
only are restricted from banning same-sex marriages (a negative
protection), but are also required to grant the appropriate recogni-
tion and benefits (a positive right).129 Although he is never explicit
about which right is being vindicated in the opinion, Justice Ken-
nedy is hinting that the deeper purpose of constitutional protection
is on both sides of the line.
None of this is to say that Obergefell completely rejects tradition
as part of the due process analysis. Tradition remains an important
factor in the analysis of a fundamental right.130 Indeed, Justice
Kennedy identifies four “principles and traditions” of marriage that
suggest why it is so fundamental to society and should be
expanded.131 First, he reminds us that the choice of whom to marry
is an essential part of personal autonomy and creates a dignified
bond between two separate people.132 Second, to the majority, mar-
riage is a “union unlike any other in its importance” to the individu-
als in the relationship.133 Third, marriage provides a stable and
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271, 286-87 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The Court has regularly ig-
nored stare decisis and out-dated economic rationales in overruling past precedent in order
to ensure antitrust jurisprudence remains consistent with current economic thinking.
126. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2608.
127. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
128. See, e.g., Mark A. Graber, Does It Really Matter? Conservative Courts in a Conservative
Era, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 675, 706 (2006) (“The Constitution, most judges and scholars
believe, ‘is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties.’” (quoting Jackson v. City of
Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983))).
129. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05; see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct.
2675, 2691-92 (2013) (defining marriage as a positive right); Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right
to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1713 (2016) (“Obergefell improves on prior doctrine by not
describing the right to marry as a negative liberty and by suggesting a normative analytical
framework for the right to marry.”).
130. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598.
131. Id. at 2599.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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predictable unit for a family to thrive.134 Finally, he recognizes that
the institution of marriage is “a keystone of our social order.”135 The
articulation of these “traditions” suggests that the role of tradition
is now much more flexible, looking to the purpose and effect of the
right sought, instead of simply asking who was able to exercise it.
Under this formulation, fundamental rights cannot be decided solely
on the idea of who was able to exercise such a right in the past.136
This is another limitation the majority opinion places on the
freedom of courts to find new rights; not only must the claimed right
redress previous subordination or discrimination, but access to the
right must also still vindicate the interests of society. While the
dissenters claim the rationale of Obergefell could lead to a right to
polygamous marriages, it is difficult, if not impossible, to fit the idea
of multiple marriages within the special “bilateral loyalty” created
by two-person marriage.137 In this way, the focus on dignity is not
limited only to that of an individual, but incorporates the dignity of
society as a whole. The place of marriage as a stabilizing force for
families and the role the institution plays within wider communities
reflect how tradition can be coupled with dignity to ratify the prom-
ise of the Constitution. Justice Kennedy’s new approach reflects a
flexible common law analysis instead of the strict lines of a histo-
rian’s straight-forward recounting.
Finally, the fact that the opinion was authored by Justice Ken-
nedy should not be underestimated. As the current “swing” Justice,
Justice Kennedy’s opinions hold significant influence that may
reflect the direction in which the Court is moving.138 Particularly
with the level of partisan divide on the current Supreme Court, Jus-
tice Kennedy nearly always holds the decisive vote on important
issues.139 Perhaps this decision should not be surprising given that
the swing Justices have historically worked to keep the Court
134. Id. at 2600-01.
135. Id. at 2601.
136. Id. at 2602.
137. See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 177 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599). But see
Harrison, supra note 16, at 146, 150-51, 154 (arguing that the history of polygamy fits it well
within the boundaries outlined by the majority opinion in Obergefell).
138. See generally JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 401-05 (2008) (discussing Justice Kennedy’s emergence as the swing Justice after
2005).
139. Bhagwat, supra note 90, at 2.
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current, reflecting “the mainstream of American public opinion.”140
Allowing such an influential Justice to author the opinion may
indicate that the Court intends for this opinion to be read and
applied broadly. 
C. The Fundamental Right Today
Having explored what the Court previously said about the right
to marry, and now Justice Kennedy’s modernization of due process
analysis and jurisprudence in Obergefell, some preliminary con-
clusions about the fundamental right to marriage can be drawn:
First, the right to marry is, at its core, concerned about the
autonomy of choice of each individual.141
Second, our society’s understanding of marriage and who is al-
lowed to marry is not a static definition, but rather one that evolves
over time.142 The same is true of the concept of family; no single
model may be preferred by the state over any other.143
Third, the role of tradition in determining who can marry is not
going to be bound up in historical decisions or mores, but rather will
be analyzed under the more robust and well-rounded approach as
articulated in Poe, with a goal of validating the dignity of the
individual plaintiffs.144
Finally, because the Obergefell opinion cements the “right to mar-
ry” as a fundamental liberty interest of individuals, it also compels
any future challenges to exclusions from that right to be analyzed
under some form of heightened scrutiny.145 Whatever one calls the
standard of review applied (strict scrutiny, heightened scrutiny, et
cetera), the Court has consistently and firmly stated that there must
140. Id. at 3.
141. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
142. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (protecting inmates’ right to marry);
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978) (allowing unwed parents to marry); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (extending constitutional protection to interracial mar-
riages).
143. See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 884-85 (2014) (“[A]ll happy families are not alike. Traditional
heterosexual marriage is not the only successful way to arrange intimate and family life.”
(footnote omitted)).
144. See supra Part II.B.
145. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597-605.
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be an important or compelling state interest implicated, and the
regulation must be narrowly drawn to effectuate that interest.146
III. APPLYING THE RIGHT TO MARRY TO CONSENTING ADULTS IN AN
INCESTUOUS RELATIONSHIP
Understanding the definition of the right to marry and the funda-
mentality and flexibility the right must exhibit under the Court’s
decisions, this Part turns to applying those standards to consenting
and consanguineous adults. For purposes of clarity, this Part uses
a hypothetical relationship between a full-blooded brother and sister
as an example. 
A. A Tradition of Incest?
Opponents of incestuous marriage will assert that the right to
marry a sibling or parent is certainly not implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty or deeply rooted in our nation’s history.147 However,
the rationale of Obergefell focused on the traditions of the institu-
tion generally and whether granting the right to the plaintiffs would
vindicate those traditions.148 Taking each of the four “principles” of
marriage outlined by the majority opinion, a consenting relationship
between consanguineous adults satisfies each.
First, absent any evidence of coercion or psychological abuse, the
choice between a brother and sister to form a romantic bond is a
product of their own autonomous choice. It is likely one of the most
difficult choices each has made. Especially after Obergefell, the state
cannot close the doors of marriage simply because it does not ap-
prove of the choice two individuals have made.149 Moreover, this con-
cept implicates the very dignity that Obergefell seeks to protect—the
right of two individuals to make a choice of their existence without
undue interference by the state.150
146. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
147. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Mark Strasser, Lawrence, Same-Sex Marriage and the Constitu-
tion: What Is Protected and Why?, 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 667, 676 (2004).
148. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599-602.
149. See id. at 2579-605.
150. See id. at 2589.
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Second, given the stigma likely to be encountered by a brother
and sister attempting to get married, the choice to go through with
a marriage demonstrates the immense importance of the union it-
self to each of them. Siblings separated at birth may find themselves
attracted to each other despite the social taboo or willingness of
society to accept their “unnatural” desires.151 As Justice Kennedy
points out, “Marriage responds to the universal fear that a lonely
person might call out only to find no one there. It offers the hope of
companionship and understanding and assurance that while both
still live there will be someone to care for the other.”152 The world is
full of marriages that society, in general, did not understand or
approve of at one time, but the Court’s history protects the right of
those individuals to enter into such marriages.153 
Third, the couple would need to show that this marriage would
help “safeguard[ ] children and families.”154 Opponents would gain
some ammunition here; one of the most common arguments against
incest is the potential for genetic harm to future offspring.155 But
that argument misinterprets Justice Kennedy’s point. The concern
raised in Obergefell is not that a family may be harmed or that
children will be hurt by the couple entering into marriage; such
abuse unfortunately occurs under our current marriage laws and
in a myriad of family constructs.156 Any neglect or abuse perpetrated
on a child of an incestuous marriage should be addressed through
existing child abuse statutes.157 Rather, Justice Kennedy’s principle
ratifies the understanding that children thrive within two-parent,
151. See Zhou, supra note 11, at 204 (noting that the current scientific consensus is that
“genetic sexual attraction,” the attraction between blood relatives reunited after being sep-
arated as children, may occur in approximately 50 percent of all cases); see also Alix Kirsta,
Genetic Sexual Attraction, GUARDIAN (May 16, 2003, 8:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.
com/theguardian/2003/may/17/weekend7.weekend2 [https://perma.cc/VQ34-HA6K] (discussing
the impact and occurrence of genetic sexual attraction).
152. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
153. See supra note 142.
154. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600.
155. See infra Part III.B.
156. See MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, ARE MARRIED PARENTS REALLY BETTER
FOR CHILDREN?: WHAT RESEARCH SAYS ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF FAMILY STRUCTURE ON CHILD
WELL-BEING 5-7 (2003).
157. Cf. In re Tiffany Nicole M., 571 N.W.2d 872, 876 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). Although the
trial court in that case found that incestuous parents were unsuitable due to their neglect, see
id. at 873-76, eliminating the incest would have very likely resulted in the same finding.
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married families.158 The effect of bans on incest, therefore, is to
harm an innocent child by excluding her family from the recognition
and rights of other families.159
Finally, allowing an incestuous marriage between brothers and
sisters is unlikely to destroy the respect in which the institution of
marriage is held as a “keystone of our social order.”160 Opponents
previously claimed that same-sex marriages, interracial marriages,
marriages involving indigents, or marriages to inmates would
destroy our social order.161 The Court, facing those situations in
Obergefell, Loving, Zablocki, and Turner, found that constitutional
protection for fundamental rights evolves along with culture and
society.162 The constitutional standard for discerning protected
constitutional interests was not static, in that as “the Constitution
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in
their own search for greater freedom.”163 Moreover, there has been
considerable evolution on just this issue. States have begun to
repeal criminal bans on incestuous activity.164 Similarly, a Danish
professor of criminal justice, Thomas Peterson, has advocated that
modern practices of sperm donation and fertilization mandate a
rethinking of “old taboos” against incest.165 Germany’s ethics counsel
has argued that incest between siblings should no longer be
criminalized, hoping to rely on the social taboo alone to limit its
occurrence.166 Concern for the protection of marriage should focus on
158. See PARKE, supra note 156, at 8.
159. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (“Without the recognition, stability, and predictabil-
ity marriage offers, ... children suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow
lesser.”).
160. Id. at 2601.
161. See supra Part II.A.
162. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604-05 (protecting same sex marriages); Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (protecting inmates’ right to marry); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374,
386-87 (1978) (allowing unwed parents to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(extending constitutional protection to interracial marriages).
163. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003).
164. See 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-6-3 (repealed 1989).
165. See Thaddeus Baklinksi, ‘Sibling Incest Should Be Legal,’ Says Danish Professor of
Criminal Justice Ethics, LIFESITE (Oct. 17, 2014, 5:57 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/
news/sibling-incest-should-be-legal-says-danish-professor-of-criminal-justice-et [https://perma.
cc/462V-227W].
166. See Lizzie Dearden, German Ethics Council Calls for Incest between Siblings to Be
Legalised by Government, INDEP. (Sept. 24, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/europe/german-ethics-council-calls-for-incest-between-siblings-to-be-legalised-by-
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actions that harm the institution—such as domestic violence and
psychological abuse—rather than the nature of the individuals who
enter into it.
Having shown that an incestuous couple has a legitimate claim
to be granted access to marriage, the analysis then turns on wheth-
er the current restrictions are a result of a state’s compelling inter-
est and, if so, whether the ban is narrowly tailored to effectuate that
interest. 
B. The State’s Interest
One leading justification favoring the state is the social and moral
taboo against incest. Since Lawrence, however, such moral interests
are insufficient on their own to justify interference with a person’s
fundamental right.167 One scholar has argued that, given the near-
universal understanding of the taboo of incest, such moral laws will
remain unchallenged and thus Lawrence is inapplicable.168 The
argument certainly has been upheld in courts that have faced the
issue, which have managed to distinguish Lawrence’s holding to
maintain the prohibition against incest.169
Such an argument, however, is more realist than legal. As the
advancement of gay rights demonstrates, taboos clearly evolve over
time.170 What is true about society today may not be true tomorrow,
or five or ten years down the road; basing laws in feelings of disgust
could result in unequal treatment. For example, it is difficult to
justify complete bans on sibling or parent-child incest with feelings
of disgust while those same laws allow first-cousin incest and,
sometimes, step-parent/step-child relationships.171 It is even pos-
government-9753506.html [https://perma.cc/CJR6-EC2L].
167. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-78.
168. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 354.
169. See, e.g., Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808, 817 (7th Cir. 2005). But see Hammer, supra
note 18, at 1079-83 (explaining why the Seventh Circuit was incorrect in distinguishing
Lawrence); Zhou, supra note 11, at 227-30 (arguing that morality and tradition do not
constitute a valid state interest for upholding bans on incest).
170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND THE LAW
81 (2004). To be frank, the additional common DNA between parents and children that is not
present between cousins may be sufficient for some to draw this line. But it should be
recognized that it is an arbitrary line, based on subjective feelings.
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sible, given the progression of the Court from Romer, to Lawrence,
to Obergefell, that a court facing the issue would deem this moral
justification irrational on its face.172
There are, however, more legitimate state interests regarding
incest, including the commonly cited concern that children of incest-
uous parents will be born with genetic defects.173 However, such a
concern has problems. Most importantly for purposes of this Note,
Obergefell explicitly distanced the right to marry from an interest
in having children.174 The majority rejected the argument that
same-sex couples should not be allowed to marry because continuing
the human race was a fundamental objective of marriage.175 Even
Justice Scalia recognized that a concern about procreation is insuf-
ficient when “the sterile and the elderly are allowed to marry.”176
Further, some modern scientific studies show that incest itself
does not cause birth defects but merely increases the chance of
defects occurring.177 There is an equal possibility that positive traits
will get passed on through incest.178 There has also been an argu-
ment that, because children of closely related individuals are more
likely to result in expression of recessive genes, there are societal
benefits to the offspring of incest.179 While it is unlucky for the
individual child suffering from the bad gene, it may in fact be good
for society (and thus the state) as a whole because the undesired
genes can be purged from the pool, rather than lurking in the
background and popping up occasionally.180 Exposing such damaging
172. See Daniel F. Piar, Morality as a Legitimate Government Interest, 117 PENN ST. L. REV.
139, 140 (2012) (pointing out that there is still “a deep and lingering uncertainty as to
whether state action based on morality is permissible”).
173. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.2 (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962);
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Sex Offenses: Consensual, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME & JUSTICE 1465,
1469 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002).
174. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (“[T]he right to marry [cannot be
conditioned] on the capacity or commitment to procreate.”).
175. See id.
176. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177. See Alex S. Prayson, Autism, Genetics, and Inbreeding: An Evolutionary View 5 (June
24, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2736171 [https://perma.
cc/HPK4-P4CB]; see also Zhou, supra note 11, at 234-36 (discussing the science of genetic
health and eugenics).
178. See Silbaugh, supra note 173, at 1469.
179. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 352-53.
180. See Bratt, supra note 15, at 267-76 (exploring the genetic implications of incest). Focus
on the genetic argument in favor of bans on incest also raises dangerous implications of
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genes is more likely to remove it from society, resulting in a net
benefit.181
Moreover, the fact that homosexual incest is common,182 but does
not include any risk of genetic mutation, further invalidates the
argument. There must be some separate justification in order to
stop a same-sex, related couple from marrying.
The argument above ties in with the final major argument, and
potentially the most compelling, in favor of bans on consanguineous
relationships—that such relationships have special potential to be
abusive or coersive.183 Such an argument claims that if adults knew
that children within their families could be legal sexual partners
once older, the adults may be more likely to view younger children
as sexual objects and groom them accordingly.184 There is certainly
no right to keep a person subordinated, and empowering the states
to prevent the manipulation of dependents is a compelling justifica-
tion to prohibit subsequent marriages between adults.185
This argument, however, does not address the core of the prob-
lem. If the interest is really in preventing abuse of minors, such
harm is already addressed through statutes explicitly dealing with
child abuse.186 Further, the speculative nature of this argument is
troubling; prescriptive legislation that bans a union ex ante intend-
ing to reduce the number or potential number of at-risk children is
inherently crudely fit.187 Blanket bans, such as the one against
incestuous marriage, are always over-inclusive in that some amount
eugenics. See id. at 276-77.
181. See Patrick Bateson, Inbreeding Avoidance and Incest Taboos, in INBREEDING, INCEST,
AND THE INCEST TABOO: THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY 24, 25
(Arthur P. Wolf & William H. Durham eds., 2004).
182. TURNER & MARYANSKI, supra note 10, at 53, 59.
183. See Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope Rhetoric, and the
Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary Family Discourse and the Incest
Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1569-70 (2005); see also McDonnell, supra note 14, at 353
(pointing out a related concern of preventing the “over-sexualiz[ation]” of family relation-
ships).
184. See Cahill, supra note 183, at 1571.
185. See Strauss, supra note 129, at 1761.
186. See Joëlle Anne Moreno, Comment, Killing Daddy: Developing a Self-Defense Strategy
for the Abused Child, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1302 n.150 (1989).
187. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-178, CYCLE OF SEXUAL ABUSE:
RESEARCH INCONCLUSIVE ABOUT WHETHER CHILD VICTIMS BECOME ADULT ABUSERS 2 (1996)
(finding that the “widespread belief that there is a ‘cycle of sexual abuse’” lacks scientific
support).
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of truly consensual activity will be caught up and prohibited.188 As
Y. Carson Zhou points out in his article addressing criminal incest
statutes, “If the state has the power to punish incest because
parent-child relationships are inherently coercive, then we must
contemplate whether the state also has the authority to ban con-
sensual office romances.”189
A more uncomfortable argument against this rationale is that
keeping incest illegal may mean that there is no reason for an
abuser to wait. If a parent is going to be punished for engaging in a
sexual relationship with his daughter whether she is above the age
of consent or not, what, other than his own questionable morals,
incentivizes him to refrain from such contact when she is
underage?190 Even with the law gone, the social taboo remains—it
is unwise to disregard the power the “disgust” factor has in chilling
behavior.191 Indeed, one could argue that keeping incestuous rela-
tionships illegal entices certain individuals as viewing such relation-
ships as more attractive, precisely because they are forbidden.192 In
such situations, there is no reason to distinguish between a family
member or a stranger, and the abuser should be punished under
generally applicable law for child sexual abuse.193 
Even given the arguments on both sides, the deeply entrenched
attitudes toward incest weigh in favor of a court to, at least, hesitate
before striking down the state statutes. It is likely that at least one,
if not more, of the interests above will be found sufficiently compel-
ling for the state to try and show that its laws are narrowly tailored. 
188. See Zhou, supra note 11, at 240-41. 
189. Id. at 240.
190. See id. (arguing that a “presumption of coercion” is problematic to survive any scrutiny
in circumstances arising from “natural biosocial impulses” such as genetic sexual attraction,
or when applied to a “sibling pair in their 30s”).
191. See Cahill, supra note 183, at 1578-87 (discussing the role of disgust and revulsion in
creating the incest taboo and subsequent regulations). As an example, in the context of gay
relationships, the strong social taboos against homosexual behavior essentially mandated that
gay individuals hide their sexual orientation. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Joanna L.
Grossman, Double Take: The Law of Embezzled Lives, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 117, 150-51 (2014).
See generally Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769 (2002) (discussing ways in which
the law forced gay people to lead a kind of double life).
192. See 3 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE CARE OF THE SELF 45
(Robert Hurley trans., 1986).
193. See Jennifer M. Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1327, 1392
(2008).
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C. Narrow Tailoring
Conceding that there may be a state interest sufficiently compel-
ling to justify some regulation of incestuous marriage, a complete
ban on an activity is almost never upheld as being narrowly tailor-
ed.194 To satisfy this scrutiny, the ban must be able to show that
every activity that occurs within its reach implicates the asserted
state interest.195 Although the idea of incest brings up distasteful
consequences, in practice not every relationship will satisfy this
standard. For example, a complete ban on incestuous relationships
with the goal of protecting minors would be over-inclusive by
encompassing relationships between consenting adult siblings who
were adopted and separated at birth, thus never raising the concern
of coercion. Similarly, it may be under-inclusive by failing to prevent
the marriage of second cousins who were abused into marrying each
other. Moreover, premising a blanket ban on incestuous marriage
to prevent genetic defects in children does not make sense when
that rationale is applied to individuals who are sterile, relationships
between gay cousins, or elderly siblings who happen to fall in love
but are past the childbearing age. 
These broad bans lead to absurd results that in no way implicate
the interests of the state. As noted in the Introduction, Nino
Esposito and Drew Bosee discovered that they are unable to get
married, despite the decision in Obergefell, because they officially
adopted each other two years earlier.196 This couple is excluded from
marriage because adoption falls within Pennsylvania’s definition of
incest.197 This relationship raises none of the concerns of the state
and likely would not raise the specter of incest in the average person
hearing about it. But the over-inclusive nature of the statute
194. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (“A complete ban can be narrowly
tailored, but only if each activity within the proscription’s scope is an appropriately targeted
evil.”).
195. See id.
196. See Wang, supra note 1.
197. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4302(c) (2016) (including the “relationship of parent and child
by adoption” within Pennsylvania’s incest statute). A judge also informed the couple that the
court does not have the authority to annul their parental relationship in order to allow them
to get married. See Wang, supra note 1.
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encompasses this relationship and thus any marriage of this form
is banned as incestuous.
One solution could be to follow the path of some states and simply
get out of regulating incest as a separate offense altogether. As
noted above, Rhode Island and Ohio have elected to rely on their
sexual abuse and battery laws to protect the state interest, rather
than specific incest statutes.198 As Professor Brett McDonnell points
out, a more narrowly drawn law, such as Michigan’s criminal sexual
misconduct law, is better suited to combat real harms of incest
because it specifically references the fact that a position of authority
was used to coerce a victim to submit.199 Laws that make no refer-
ence to the relationship, but point to the specific conduct—abuse or
coercion—that gives rise to the state concern, should not run into
constitutional problems.200 Coercive or abusive relationships are
appropriately handled under traditional lack-of-consent crimes
regulating sexual assault in all cases.201 
Another alternative is for states to closely examine what harm
they aim to prevent. For example, a state may, with good reason, be
concerned with preventing coercion or abuse of minors because of
the difficulty in getting minors to report such abuse.202 But an out-
right ban on such relationships does not address the identified con-
cern; children still may not come forward to report abuse that does
occur. Instead, a more narrow remedy, such as imposing increased
penalties in situations in which the abuser is a family member or,
more broadly, in a supervisory position over the child, could deter
198. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
199. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 354 n.109 (citing MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 750.520b(1)(b)(iii) (1984)).
200. See id.
201. Cf. Note, supra note 23, at 2467-68. It is important to recognize that the laws may be
insufficient to protect against the psychological harm such relationships may cause.
Psychological coercion may not satisfy the elements of a particular state’s rape or assault
laws. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 792 P.2d 1103, 1106 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that a
principal who threatened to block a student’s graduation unless she consented to sexual
intercourse could not be convicted of the crime of “sexual intercourse without consent”). The
answer in such cases should be to reform the current laws, rather than have a blanket
prohibition that chills consensual activities between mature individuals. See Collins et al.,
supra note 193, at 1392.
202. See DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE
OF FAMILY TIES 122-23 (2009); see also TURNER & MARYANSKI, supra note 10, at 181 (discus-
sing how the evolution of the modern nuclear family makes incest “much easier to conceal”). 
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such activity.203 In other words, if the abuser has coercive power
over the minor, then the criminal penalties would be proportionally
increased.204 Admittedly, this may not directly increase the number
of children reporting improper conduct, but it does avoid the over-
inclusiveness of a blanket ban.
D. A Recommendation for States
Suggestions for specific rules regulating relationships and sexual
contact between family members could be as high as the number of
scholars writing about it. The solution would depend on the
corresponding asserted state interest. Instead of attempting to
define what these rules should be, this Note proposes a constitu-
tional test that allows states to maintain incest within their
respective codes and may be found outside the Court’s marriage
jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey was arguably grounded in the similar
type of liberty interest that is implicated in the marriage context in
Obergefell.205 In Casey, the Court ratified the core holding of the
landmark case Roe v. Wade, which protected a woman’s right to
have an abortion.206 The joint opinion, authored in part by Justice
Kennedy, clearly focused on the dignity and liberty of women that
must be protected.207 Moreover, the Court noted that their “obliga-
tion is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral
code.”208 In that case, the Court held that an “undue burden” stan-
dard was the appropriate means of reconciling a state’s interest
with an individual’s protected liberty.209 Although the undue burden
standard is an amorphous test, if a state restriction “has the pur-
pose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
203. See MARKEL ET AL., supra note 202, at 122.
204. This need not be limited only to family members. 
205. See generally Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence
v. Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21.
206. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852-53 (1992).
207. See id. at 848-50.
208. Id.
209. See id. at 876; see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309-10
(2016) (discussing the undue burden standard).
2017] EXPLORING THE BOUNDARIES OF OBERGEFELL 2095
woman” choosing to exercise her right to terminate a pregnancy,
then the restriction constitutes an unlawful “undue burden.”210
Regulations that allow a state to “express profound respect for the
life of the unborn,” however, are permissible so long as they properly
acknowledge the woman’s protected dignity and liberty.211 Thus,
while Casey did not overturn Roe v. Wade, the decision does soften
the Court’s stance toward regulation by indicating that a state could
discourage abortion (or other constitutionally protected activities)
with a valid purpose.212 However, lower courts have struggled with
defining what portion of the population must be affected or what
impact the restriction must have for an obstacle to be considered an
“undue burden.”213
This inherent ambiguity, coupled with the similarities between
the liberty interest described in Casey, and the dignity interest of
the plaintiffs upheld in Obergefell, may provide states with an
avenue to continue regulating marriage. The Court has held that an
informed consent requirement and a 24-hour waiting period are
permissible under the standard articulated in Casey.214 Conversely,
the Supreme Court most recently decided that both requiring doc-
tors to have admitting privileges at hospitals within thirty miles of
an abortion facility and requiring that abortion facilities meet sur-
gical-center standards constituted an undue burden on a woman’s
right to choose.215 Applying this rationale to incestuous marriage,
210. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.); see also
Bebe J. Anderson, Litigating Abortion Access Cases in the Post-Windsor World, 29 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 143, 145-46 (2015).
211. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
212. See Mark H. Woltz, Note, A Bold Reaffirmation? Planned Parenthood v. Casey Opens
the Door for States to Enact New Laws to Discourage Abortion, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1787, 1788
(1993).
213. See Okpalobi v. Foster, 190 F.3d 337, 354 (5th Cir. 1999) (“The Casey Court provided
little, if any, instruction regarding the type of inquiry lower courts should undertake to
determine whether a regulation has the ‘purpose’ of imposing an undue burden.”), rev’d on
other grounds, 244 F.3d 405 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Cincinnati Women’s Servs., Inc. v. Taft,
468 F.3d 361, 370-74 (6th Cir. 2006) (striking down a single-petition restriction as a substan-
tial obstacle for “practically all” of an impacted population, but upholding an in-person rule
because it would only affect about 12 percent of the group).
214. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884-87 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.).
215. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2312-16 (2016); see also
Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 953 (W.D. Wis. 2015)
(considering the health benefits of admitting-privilege laws), aff’d sub nom. Planned Parent-
hood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015).
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perhaps states could impose a waiting period on incestuous
marriage to provide both parties with information about the known
risks and rationales against consanguineous marriage.216 But
mandating sterilization or an agreement that the incestuous couple
would not procreate would almost certainly violate that couple’s
constitutional rights.217 
A middle ground may be for a state to require counseling or a
hearing before a judge to explore the possibility of abuse or coercion
between the parties.218 For example, Virginia recently enacted a law
setting the minimum age of marriage at eighteen.219 The law is
“aimed at curbing forced marriage, human trafficking and statutory
rape disguised as marriage.”220 However, the law also allows pro-
cedures for minors to petition a juvenile judge to “emancipate” them
if the “judge finds the minor is not being compelled to marry, the
parties are mature enough, the marriage will not endanger the
minor and the marriage is in the best interest of the minor.”221 In
the incestuous marriage context, a judge could find that there is no
danger of coercion and that this marriage does not implicate any of
the purported harms of incest, and grant an order allowing the
couple to marry. In our exemplar case of Drew Bosee and Nino
Esposito, this would allow the judge to determine that their adopted
relationship does not implicate any state concern and that their
216. Cf. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) 
(upholding the constitutionality of a waiting period for women seeking abortions). The Casey
Court focused on the necessity of a doctor obtaining informed consent from a patient as part
of its rationale. Id. It is doubtful that a mere state or municipal employee, authorized to grant
marriage licenses, would be similarly justified in delaying marriages without a medical
component to their duties.
217. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (holding that
compulsory sterilization is unconstitutional); Women’s Med. Prof’l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130
F.3d 187, 201 (6th Cir. 1997) (striking down a state law prohibiting the second most common
abortion procedure as violating the undue burden standard).
218. See Elsa M. Shartsis, Casey and Abortion Rights in Michigan, 10 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
313, 345 (1993) (“[U]nder the Casey undue burden standard, one cannot say that the State
could not mandate a second (or third) medical opinion; a hospital review board; or other third-
party involvement beyond the doctor-patient relationship.”).
219. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-48 (2017).
220. Jenna Portnoy, Why 13-Year-Olds Can No Longer Marry in Virginia, WASH. POST
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marriage should be allowed to proceed.222 Because the law does not
impose a complete ban, it may survive heightened scrutiny under
the Court’s marriage jurisprudence.223
In sum, there may be avenues a state could pursue to continue
regulating incest and incestuous marriage. Such measures may not
even be likely, because regardless of the legal prohibitions, incestu-
ous relationships remain on the fringe of society and will be deter-
red simply by the social stigma.224 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Any state attempting to allow consanguineous marriages in the
face of the entrenched incest taboo will no doubt face harsh criticism
and an uphill battle. The following counterarguments raise concerns
in opposition to the above analysis.
A. Incest Is Conduct 
Opponents could argue that incestuous behavior is merely the
conduct of the participating individuals, rather than any inherent
status, and as such should be well within the police power of the
state.225 Because the couple could choose to be with someone else—
either man or woman—there is no threat that they are being
subordinated or excluded from the law.
This argument improperly broadens the concept of conduct in the
marriage arena. All marriages, by their nature, are a product of the
choice of two individuals. Allowing the state to prohibit marriages
based on conduct that does not fall within a separate protection
potentially allows a state to identify any mere conduct and disallow
such marriages. Certainly, a state could not ban marriages on the
basis of race, age, disability, or sexual orientation, but states may
222. Whether the adoption should, and could, be annulled under Pennsylvania law is a
question outside the scope of this Note.
223. See supra Part II.C.
224. Cahill, supra note 183, at 1578-83.
225. For this type of argument in the polygamy context, see Edward Stein, Plural Mar-
riage, Group Marriage and Immutability in Obergefell v. Hodges and Beyond, 84 UMKC L.
REV. 871, 873-74 (2016).
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be able to proscribe a rich man from marrying a poor woman.226
Similarly, if a state decided it disapproved of individuals with an
age disparity greater than five years from marrying, then that
would be conduct they could proscribe as well.227 A state may still
need to articulate an important or compelling interest to justify its
law, but the point is that the choice to marry someone of a lower
economic class or a different age is conduct outside of any protected
class. Allowing such expansion of the state’s power regarding
marriage would conflict with the Supreme Court’s trend of encour-
aging autonomy of choice in whom to marry.
Further, there is a type of status associated with being a member
of a family. Particularly in the immigration context, being a family
member has been found to be an immutable trait that is worthy of
protection.228 Although Justice Kennedy was never explicit about
declaring homosexuality an immutable trait, his conclusion that gay
individuals would be consigned to a lonely life without legalizing
same-sex marriage suggests that he would consider such unchange-
able characteristics in future analyses.229 And consider again the
hypothetical brother and sister. If the sister wants to marry a
person who is not her family member—black, white, man, woman,
or federal inmate—under controlling Supreme Court precedent, she
may do so and the state cannot interfere. But if she wants to marry
her brother, she may not—not because her act is fundamentally dif-
ferent in this circumstance, but because of who she and her brother
are, namely a consanguineous pair. That is, in both scenarios, the
sister is making a choice and the limitation in the latter scenario is
226. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 42 (2006) (“[S]ocio-
economic status is not a protected class under federal equal protection analysis.”). 
227. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (finding that
age is not a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis). 
228. See, e.g., Crespin-Valladares v. Holder, 632 F.3d 117, 124 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding kin-
ship ties are a “paradigmatically immutable” characteristic); see also Al-Ghorbani v. Holder,
585 F.3d 980, 995 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that family ties can provide a basis for a protected
social group); Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir. 2009) (same); Jie Lin v. Ashcroft,
377 F.3d 1014, 1028 (9th Cir. 2004) (same); Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir.
1993) (same).
229. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015). It is interesting to note that
polygamy as a marriage construct is more vulnerable to this argument. That is, restrictions
on polygamy prohibit the conduct of marrying more than one partner regardless of the status
of the parties to the marriage. See Yoshino, supra note 97, at 177.
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only imposed because of their status as brother and sister, over
which they have no control. There is even an argument that this
type of attraction is not a choice at all but part of an inherent
genetic attraction.230 Allowing the marriage to occur removes these
difficult questions and, as discussed above, grants the states room
to still prohibit the conduct they are most concerned about, namely
coercion and abuse.
B. No One Wants to Legalize Incest
Even if there may be an opening for incestuous relationships,
from a realist perspective it may be unlikely that society or, in a
more limited fashion, the courts will ever be able to respond
accordingly. Both social and political factors may influence future
reviews of incest statutes. Further, the individual policy preferences
of the Justices, coupled with the Court’s discretion in which cases it
grants certiorari, dramatically limit the chances of such a case ever
actually reaching the Court for review.
First, there is no current grass roots or political support for incest
in the same way as there was for same-sex marriage. The impor-
tance of public input and support for a change in our constitutional
understanding should not be underestimated.231 Social movements
can shape the legal landscape both directly, through litigation and
lobbying, or indirectly, by imparting political support to a particular
cause.232 Studies have recognized that the Supreme Court responds
to changes in the dominant public opinion, even if the makeup or
ideology of the Court has not changed.233 This may reflect a belief
230. See Kirsta, supra note 151.
231. For a detailed discussion of the role that social movements and public opinion play in
influencing the Supreme Court, see Corinna Barrett Lain, Soft Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1609, 1654-61 (2017).
232. See Lauren B. Edelman et al., On Law, Organizations, and Social Movements, 6 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 653, 657 (2010).
233. See William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a
Countermajoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion of Supreme Court Decisions,
87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 87, 96 (1993) (“[T]he evidence suggests that public opinion exercises
important influence on the decisions of the Court even in the absence of changes in the
composition of the Court or in the partisan and ideological makeup of Congress and the
presidency.”). This concept is not new to the Court; numerous Justices have recognized the
impact public support for a particular constitutional decision has had on the Court’s decision-
making. See, e.g., Lain, supra note 231, at 1639 n.105 (collecting quotes from various Supreme
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that majority rule dictates the correct answer to constitutional ques-
tions, or merely that the Supreme Court Justices are susceptible to
the same influences and viewpoints that the majority of society face.
Whatever the reasoning behind this phenomenon, it appears clear
that public advocacy makes it easier for the Court to rule in a way
that matches the public’s position. For example, each step on the
path from Romer to Obergefell coincided with the growth of support
for same-sex marriage, but it is difficult to find that same progres-
sion in the area of incest.234
Importantly, such a change is generally only seen when social
movements do not coincide with the legal status quo. When the
current social mores are in agreement with a legal consensus, the
two “are mutually reinforcing” and may prevent change from
happening.235 Currently, there is a consensus among the circuit
courts that have considered challenges to incest that such laws
should be upheld.236 
Such lack of support may be due to the secrecy required of those
who would otherwise advocate for incest. The need to keep these re-
lationships secret for fear of being ostracized gives supporters much
less ability to organize. Groups that might be potential advocates for
such general equality, such as the feminist movement, typically ar-
gue in favor of further enforcement of these laws under the banner
of protecting children.237 One group that may be able to voice sup-
port is immigrants, particularly those coming from countries where
incest is more acceptable.238 However, even these groups are limited
in their ability to turn most of the populace to such an unpopular
belief. Public opinion is much more likely to condemn marriage
between siblings than same-sex marriage. The current trend in
Court Justices).
234. See Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026,
1118-20 (2003) (describing the “typology” of slippery slopes).
235. Edelman et al., supra note 232, at 658.
236. See generally Nguyen v. Holder, 743 F.3d 311 (2d Cir. 2014); Lowe v. Swanson, 663
F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2011); Muth v. Frank, 412 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Nicolas, supra
note 103, at 343 & n.69.
237. See BELL, supra note 39, at 134-36.
238. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on Con-
stitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2274-79 (2002) (discussing
the effect social movements, such as immigration, have on inspiring major constitutional
changes).
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liberalization of incest is only beginning and has a substantial path
ahead before it reaches the same level of support as same-sex
marriage.
The second realist obstacle to changing incest laws is the views of
the Supreme Court itself. Professor McDonnell offers a compelling
analysis of how the Justices’ worldview and policy preferences limit
the opportunity for changes to incest law.239 He points out that
Supreme Court Justices tend to be pulled from a well-educated
group, and thus more liberal in their views on policy matters.240
However, even the liberal Justices are not young, and as past cases
involving sexual matters show, they tend to be uncomfortable with
such issues.241 Further, complete legalization of incestuous marriage
may be too far of a leap for some Justices to accept, and, therefore,
they will look for a nonarbitrary way to distinguish between incest
and other marriage relationships.242 The overtly expressive quality
of the dissenters in cases such as Lawrence and Obergefell high-
lights this difficulty. Justice Scalia believed the Court had already
“largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda,”243 while he
himself appeared to have signed on to a conservative agenda that
would not even entertain a challenge to an incest law.
More basically, the Supreme Court may just decide it does not
want to hear such a case. The power of the Court to grant certiorari
is one of complete judicial discretion.244 Factors that may influence
the Court are circuit splits and unsettled important points of federal
law.245 For example, the Court waited to take another same-sex
marriage case (Obergefell) until the Sixth Circuit split from other
circuit decisions to uphold a ban on same-sex marriage.246 The re-
sulting circuit split necessitated an answer from the Supreme Court.
Given the consensus currently existing at the circuit level, there
239. See McDonnell, supra note 14, at 354-56.
240. See id. at 355.
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
244. SUP. CT. R. 10.
245. Id.
246. Compare DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (upholding a ban on same-sex
marriage), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (2015), with Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.
2014) (striking down a same-sex marriage ban), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014), and Bostic
v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (same), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 308 (2014).
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may not be the opportunity for advocates of incest to even argue
their case. 
This is a most likely situation and a valid criticism of the theory.
Constitutional doctrine is too muddy and, apparently, subject to
change depending on which Justice picks up his or her pen.
However, this does not provide much support or confidence to states
when considering their own laws. It is also still very early after the
Obergefell decision, and lower courts may be inspired to re-examine
their decisions regarding limitations on marriage, given this new
rationale. More importantly, the views of the international commu-
nity toward incest, combined with the repeal of criminal penalties
for incest in certain U.S. states, demonstrate that the social antip-
athy toward incest may be crumbling. Although it is unlikely that
support will rise at the same pace as the support for same-sex
marriage, social evolution may force the Supreme Court to fit incest
into its new jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
Substantive due process has always been a murky area of
constitutional law; balancing the interests of an individual against
purported state concerns will never be an exact science. By rejecting
wooden doctrines that bind fundamental rights to concepts of
history and tradition, the majority opinion in Obergefell acknowl-
edged these difficulties and laid out a much broader and more
holistic test.247 More importantly, the decision firmly rooted the
fundamental right to marry in the protections of the Due Process
Clause and the concept of individual dignity.248
While not advocating for incestuous marriage, this Note argues
that these changes have opened the door for challenges to state bans
against consenting adult incestuous marriage and other relationship
constructs. States that wish to continue prohibiting incest for this
narrow group must now articulate both a compelling interest to
justify their law and craft the restriction narrowly to effectuate that
interest.249 States may still have the opportunity to narrow their
247. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
249. See supra Part II.C.
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laws to proscribe only the conduct society is truly concerned about—
abuse and coercion of children within the family environment.250 Or,
a court may decide that the similarities between the dignity of an
incestuous couple and the liberty interest of a pregnant woman
mandate that the “undue burden” test should be expanded into this
area. Whatever the approach, it should be clear that current abso-
lute prohibitions extending beyond consanguinity to individuals
related by marriage or adoption are far too over-inclusive and can-
not satisfy this type of heightened scrutiny. 
However, the legal argument cannot be the end of the inquiry.
Changes to civil rights, abortion, and same-sex marriage all came
about, in large part, because of popular support from a majority of
the community. Without a similar swell of public support and
acceptance of incestuous relationships, the chances of a successful
challenge to these types of laws even reaching the Supreme Court
remain small. Perhaps the more important question is how this new
approach to fundamental rights, if it can be called that, will be
applied in other areas of entrenched attitudes to help move our
society closer to a broader view of freedom and equality.
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